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MODERN PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Kevin Meisner*
I. Introduction: Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
This comment discusses modern problems of criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country,' including an analysis of the Supreme Court's
1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.
2
Today three sovereign entities have criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed on Indian reservations: the Indian tribes, the federal gov-
ernment, and the states. Who has jurisdiction over a criminal offense
depends on many factors, including location and degree of the crime,
who committed the crime, and whom the crime was committed against.
At one time the Indian tribes had jurisdiction over all people who
committed crimes in Indian Country.3 This jurisdiction has been
chipped away by Congress, however, through statutes such as the
Major Crimes Act, 4 which transferred jurisdiction over some offenses
committed on Indian reservations to the federal government, and
Public Law 280,5 which transferred complete civil and criminal juris-
diction to several states.
The Supreme Court has also chipped away at tribal jurisdiction
over crimes committed on Indian reservations. In Oliphant, the Court
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This comment was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Duro v. Reina
(495 U.S. 676 (1990)). Since that decision, Congress has passed legislation providing
tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Elsewhere in this issue of the
Review, Professor Nell Jessup Newton discusses the congressional remedies. See Pro-
fessor Newton's commentary, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, supra
page 109. - Ed.
1. The term "Indian Country" includes Indian reservations. This discussion
focuses primarily on criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations that have tribal courts,
but all the principles of criminal jurisdiction discussed apply to other "Indian Country"
as well. For an excellent discussion of "what is Indian Country," see FE~Ix COHEN,
HANDBOOK or FEDERAL ItDiA' LAW 5-8 (1942 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN (1942 ErD.)].
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3. COHEN (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 364.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
5. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
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held. that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
commit crimes in Indian Country.6 Since there is much non-Indian
crime on today's Indian reservations, 7 the tribes are forced to rely on
state and federal courts to try non-Indian offenders. Unfortunately
for the tribes, state and federal prosecutors either lack jurisdiction
over such cases or are reluctant or unwilling to prosecute Indian
reservation criminal offenders. As a result of Oliphant, frequently
there is no one willing or able to prosecute non-Indian offenders for
crimes committed on Indian reservations.
While tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian crime was the issue in
Oliphant, the Court occasionally used the broader term "nonmem-
bers" to describe the non-Indians at issue. The use of this term has
brought into question tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. For the purposes of this comment, nonmember Indians are
Indian people who live on or are visiting the forum reservation but
are not of the forum tribe." For example, a Sioux Indian who lives
on or visits the Wind River Indian Reservation, home of the Shoshone
and Arapaho Indians, could be considered a nonmember Indian for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction.
Federal courts disagree as to whether the Indian tribes have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Two courts of appeal have come
to opposite conclusions. In Duro v. Reina,9 the Ninth Circuit held
that tribal courts have such criminal jurisdiction. 0 In Greywater v.
Joshua," the Eighth Circuit came to the contrary conclusion. 12 To
settle the conflict in the courts of appeal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Duro.13
6. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.
7. See 4 NATIONAL AM. INDIAN CouRT JtnoEs ASS'N, JUSTICE AND THE AMBRICAN
INDIAN 51-52 (1974); Hearings on S. I and S. 1400 (Reform of the Federal Criminal
Lawsy Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6469 (1973).
8. A nonmember Indian by definition is someone who is not a recognized member
of the Indian tribe. Sometimes this has nothing at all to do with race. There are
Indians who are racially full blooded "Apaches" or "Cherokees" but for some reason
(i.e. their ancestors are not on the tribal role) are not considered members of the
Indian tribe in question. There are Indian people who belong to "terminated" tribes
(i.e. the Klamath Tribe) who are racially 100% Indian, but are not considered "Indians"
for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Some tribes are divided into two or more groups
(e.g. Northern and Southern Arapaho or Eastern and Western Shoshone) and the
groups are settled on different reservations. Members of the divided tribes are of the
same "race" and many are closely related to members of the other group. But a
Northern Arapaho is not a member of the Southern Arapaho tribe for purposes of
federal acknowledgment.
9. 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
10. Id. at 1146.
11. 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
12. Id. at 493.
13. 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
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Two problems may arise from the Court's decision in Duro. First,
if the Supreme Court holds that the tribes lack criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians, the existing jurisdictional void will be ex-
panded. Alternatively, if the Court holds that the tribes retain criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, equal protection questions will
be raised.
This comment discusses possible solutions to each of these problems.
Solutions are available to both the United States Congress and the
Indian tribes. At least two solutions are available to Congress. Con-
gress could recognize the tribal right to criminal jurisdiction over all
who enter the forum Indian reservations. This would eliminate the
jurisdictional void and the equal protection problems completely.
Alternatively, Congress could recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction
over all who have significant contacts with the Indian reservations.
This would significantly reduce the jurisdictional void problem and
eliminate the equal protection problem.
At least three solutions are available to the Indian tribes. First, for
purpose of criminal jurisdiction, the tribes could expand their defi-
nition of "tribal member" to include those people who have signifi-
cant contacts with the reservation and who thus benefit from the
protection of tribal laws. Second, because the tribes have extensive
civil jurisdiction over all persons who enter their reservations, the
tribes could replace their criminal codes with extensive civil prohibi-
tions against unlawful conduct on the reservations. Finally, as a last
resort, the tribes could exclude all nonmembers from their territory.
Each of these solutions would reduce or eliminate the jurisdictional
void problem and eliminate the equal protection problem.
II. Limitations and Problems of Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
A. Congressional Action
Congress, pursuant to its plenary power over the Indian tribes, has
acted to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations. The
Constitution states that "Congress shall have the power ... [to]
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.' 1 4 From this sparse language, the Supreme
Court declared that the "conquered" Indian tribes were "domestic,
dependent nations" subject to the plenary power of Congress."
The "plenary power" doctrine has severely affected the American
Indian tribes, and is seriously questioned by some Indian law experts
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645
(1977); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
15. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
No. 1]
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today. s Practically, plenary power means that Congress can declare
that a tribe no longer exists, 17 sell tribal lands,' and deem the tribal
laws null and void.19 Congress used its plenary power when it passed
the Major Crimes Act2" in 1885 and Public Law 28021 in 1953.
Both the Major Crimes Act and Public Law 280 represent major
incursions on traditional tribal powers. The Major Crimes Act was
Congress' response to the Supreme Court's decision in the famous
case, Ex parte Crow Dog. 22 In Crow Dog, the Supreme Court held
1.6. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD COMmITTEE ON NATIVE AMESicAN STRUGGLES,
RnTmuKno INDIAN LAW 117-18, 131 (1982); S. James Anaya, Address at 14th Annual
Indian Law Conference (Apr. 7, 1989).
17. In 1953 the federal government officially adopted a policy of assimilation
through termination. See Fnux S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 152
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN (1982 ED.)]. Termination was
designed to phase out the federal government's trust relationship with the Indian tribes.
If Congress determined that a tribe was economically stable and capable of managing
its own affairs, the tribe could be "terminated." Upon termination, the federal
government was no longer required to hold the tribe's land in trust or provide services
to the tribe.
18. It was President Arthur's conviction that the Indians should be assimilated
and acculturated. Congress followed suit with the Dawes Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119,
24 Stat. 388, designed to encourage individual Indians to privately farm parcels of
land allotted to them in fee simple. Congress gave individual tribal members title to
tracts of land on a reservation, typically 160 acre plots. Once each tribal member was
allotted his 160 acres, the rest of the reservation land was opened up for settlement
for non-Indians.
The Dawes Act was a failure. The concept of fee ownership was foreign to the
Indians; the earth was sacred and could belong to no man or woman. On the whole,
Indian attempts at farming also failed. As a result of the Dawes Act, Indian lands
were reduced from 136,397,985 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres by 1934. As one legal
scholar noted:
[T]he blow was less economic than psychological and even spiritual. A
way of life had been smashed; a value system destroyed. Indian poverty,
ignorance, and ill health were the results. The admired order and the
sense of community often observed in the early Indian communities were
replaced by the easily caricatured features of rootless, shiftless, drunken
outcasts, so familiar to the reader of early twentieth-century newspapers.
C A AEs F. WIL.SON, AmERICAN INDIANS, TniE AND THE LAW 21 (1987).
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-497 (1988)) (Wheeler-Howard Act) effectively ended allotment in 1934, and
granted additional reservation lands to some Indian tribes; see WLKINSON, supra, at
21; see also NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATTORNEYs GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN INDIAN JURIS-
DICTICN 3 (1974).
19. As in Public Law 280 states.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
21. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
22. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). One day after a tribal council meeting, Crow Dog, a
Sioux Indian leader, had a confrontation with his political enemy Spotted Tail, another
Sioux. Spotted Tail drew his pistol, but before he could fire Crow Dog mortally
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/8
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that the United States District Court of South Dakota lacked juris-
diction over a Sioux Indian who had already been punished by his
tribe for the killing of another Indian.2 The Major Crimes Act granted
the federal government jurisdiction over a number of crimes commit-
ted on Indian reservations, including murder, kidnapping, rape, and
robbery. 24 The effect of the Major Crimes Act may have been less
than originally intended. Some tribes continue to exercise jurisdiction
over these crimes, arguing that the Act did not rescind tribal juris-
diction, but that Congress and the Indian tribes have concurrent
jurisdiction over these offenses. 2
Public Law 280 was part of Congress' termination policy. Specifi-
cally, Public Law 280 granted six states - Alaska, California, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin - broad civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Eight other states26 were given
the right to amend their state constitutions or to enact legislation to
assume jurisdiction at their discretion. 2 Like the Major Crimes Act,
Public Law 280 has had less effect than its draftsmen intended. With
the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,28 the efficacy
of Public Law 280 was greatly diminished. States that had not assumed
jurisdiction over reservation Indians were denied that power without
the consent of the Indian tribes. States that had assumed jurisdiction
wounded him with a rifle. Crow Dog fled to hide in the mountains. After a while,
Crow Dog returned to face the Sioux Tribal Council. Using traditional Sioux Indian
law principles of restitution, the Council sentenced Crow Dog to take Spotted Tail's
family into his lodge, providing Spotted Tail's wives with a husband and Spotted Tail's
children with a father and provider.
People in the surrounding non-Indian communities were outraged that the "Indian
murderer" Crow Dog was free. Subsequently Crow Dog was arrested, jailed, and
sentenced to death by the United States District Court of Dakota. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, Crow Dog was granted a writ of habeas corpus,
the Court holding that the district court had no jurisdiction over him. With Crow Dog
again free, the non-Indians were more outraged than before. In response to much
political pressure, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
23. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
24. The Major Crimes Act also covers arson, assault, maiming, larceny, receiving
stolen property, false pretenses/fraud on the high seas, manslaughter, attempted hom-
icide, conspiracy to commit murder, and statutory rape. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
25. See COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 339-41; Telephone Interview with
Judy Leaming, In-House Counsel with the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe (October, 1989),
indicating that in the absence of federal prosecution, the Ute Mountain Ute tribe and
other tribes will assume criminal jurisdiction over crimes included in the Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
26. Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Utah, and Washington.
27. Greg P. Mackey, Indian Self-Determination, Tribal Sovereignty, and Criminal
Jurisdiction: What About the Nonmember Indian?, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 379, 385.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
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over Indians were given the right to return jurisdiction to the federal
government. 29 Today states may assume jurisdiction over Indian tribes
only with the consent of the tribes. Public Law 280 thus is not a
great force in Indian law outside of the few states that have retained
jurisdiction gained pursuant to the Act.
B. Court Action: The Effects of United States v. McBratney,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, and Duro v. Reina
The federal courts have also acted to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction
on Indian reservations. For example, in United States v. McBratney,0
the Supreme Court in 1882 held that the states have criminal juris-
diction over crimes committed by one non-Indian against another on
Indian reservations. 3 However, apart from this special case, the tribes'
jurisdiction over non-Indians generally continued to be unchallenged
for nearly a century.
Until recently, it was well settled that an Indian tribe retained
sovereign powers unless removed by federal statute or relinquished by
treaty. 32 However, in Oliphant,33 the Supreme Court in 1978 expanded
its own authority to limit tribal powers by holding that powers not
"inherent" or historically held by the tribes do not exist unless
dele gated to the tribes by Congress.3 4 Two. weeks later, in United
States v. Wheeler,35 the Court held that it could invalidate tribal
powers that are "inconsistent" with an Indian tribe's "dependent
status. "36
In Oliphant, the Court eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, even in cases where the party harmed by the crime was
the tribe or its members.3 7 In the case, two non-Indian residents,
Oliphant and Belgarde, were arrested by the Suquamish Tribe for
alleged crimes committed on the Port Madison Indian Reservation.
The Suquamish Tribe's 1973 Law and Order Code extended the tribe's
criminal jurisdiction to both Indians and non-Indians. The tribe posted
29. Id.
30. 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
31. Id. at 622.
32. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959); United States v.
Kagarma, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U.S. 188, 196 (1876); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
33. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
34. Id. at 204-05.
35. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
36. It would be difficult to show how criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and
nonmember Indians would be inconsistent with the tribes' "dependent status," since
the tribes have no one but themselves to rely on for enforcement of tribal laws. Id.
at 323.
37. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
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signs at the entrances to the reservation informing the public that all
who entered the reservation impliedly consented to be subject to the
laws of the tribe. Oliphant was arrested during the Suquamish Tribe's
"Chief Seattle Days" celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal
officer and resisting arrest. Belgarde was arrested after an alleged
high-speed race on reservation highways that ended when Belgarde
crashed into a tribal police vehicle. Both defendants argued that the
tribe lacked jurisdiction over them because they were non-Indians.
The Supreme Court in Oliphant held that because criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians was not an "inherent," or historically held,
sovereign right of the Indian tribes, the Suquarnish Tribe lacked
criminal jurisdiction over Oliphant and Belgarde.a The Oliphant de-
cision is discussed in detail below.
1. The Jurisdictional Void
Non-Indian crime is prevalent on Indian reservations. 9 Since the
Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant has
forced the Indian tribes to depend on state and federal courts to
prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes on reservations. It appears,
however, that the tribes have no one to depend on but themselves.
In Oliphant, for example, the Suquamish Indian Tribe, in anticipation
of the thousands of people who were expected to crowd a small area
on the Port Madison Indian Reservation for the weekend of the Chief
Seattle Days celebration, requested law enforcement assistance from
the local county and from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Western
Washington Agency. The county provided a single deputy for one
eight-hour period, and the BIA refused assistance. The Supreme Court
did not mention these facts in its opinion. The Court also failed to
mention the jurisdictional void problem, which was a significant
concern of the lower court. 40
While Congress has provided for concurrent federal jurisdiction
over crimes committed between Indians and non-Indians in Indian
Country,4' federal prosecutors have not often pursued such jurisdic-
tion, except in the most serious cases. 42 This is partially due to the
38. Id.
39. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
40. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
41. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1988). Section 1152 extends federal enclave law
to Indian Country, although not to offenses committed by an Indian against another
Indian nor to any Indian who has already been punished under tribal law. Under the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988), federal enclave law incorporates local
state law where federal law defines no equivalent offense. See also Williams v. United
States, 327 U.S. 711, 717 (1946).
42. COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 340; see NATIONAL AM. INDnIA COURT
JUDGES ASW'N, INDIAN CouRTs AND TE FUTURE 42 (1978).
No. 1]
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fact that many of the crimes committed on Indian reservations are
misdemeanors. With crowded dockets, often backlogged with several
years worth of cases to be heard, federal courts place criminal mis-
demeanors committed on Indian reservations low on their priority
lists. Testimony at congressional hearings has revealed that federal
prosecution has been inadequate. 4
Thus state prosecutors are, practically speaking, often responsible
for prosecuting non-Indian criminal offenders on Indian reservations.
Unfortunately, the state prosecutors, unsure of their state's jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed on Indian reservations, hesitate to pros-
ecute such offenders." They are equally reluctant to spend their time
on the minor offenses often at issue. Thus, non-Indians who commit
crimes on Indian reservations are frequently not prosecuted.
2. The Nonmember Indian Controversy
The Court in Oliphant was not considering tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians. As a result, there has been confusion
over whether the Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians. Subsequently, language in three Supreme Court
opinions has seemingly broadened the holding in Oliphant. In Wheeler,"
decided two weeks after Oliphant, Justice Stewart in dictum stated
that Oliphant stood for the proposition that "nonmembers" of an
Indian tribe could not be tried for crimes in tribal court. In Montana
v. United States,46 a 1980 case, the Court stated that Oliphant sup-
ported the proposition that "the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to nonmembers of the tribe." 47 And in
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,4 ' a 1982 case, Justice Stevens,
dissenting, stated that Oliphant held that the Indian tribes lack crim-
inal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmembers on the Indian
reservation. 49
This language from these several opinions has been cited to the
federal courts to argue that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction
43. Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations: Hearing on S. 3092 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 27-28 (1985).
44. Interview with Agnes Cunha, Tribal Chairperson of the Paucatuck Eastern
Pequot Tribe (Oct. 22, 1989).
45. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
46. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
47. Id. at 549. But see National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845,
853-55 (1985); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). Both cases say Oliphant is limited to non-Indians.
48. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
49. Id. at 171-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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over nonmember Indians. 50 The Supreme Court will soon decide this
question in Duro v. Reina.5 1
a) Expanded Jurisdictional Void
In Duro, the Court faces a difficult problem. The facts of Duro
are far more favorable to the forum Indian tribe than were the facts
of Oliphant. In Oliphant, 63% of the Port Madison Reservation's
7276 acres were owned in fee simple by non-Indians, and only fifty
members of the Suquamish Indian tribe lived among 2928 non-Indian
residents of the Port Madison Reservation. In Duro, the criminal
defendant in the case was an Indian, but not a member of the forum
tribe. He lived on the Salt River Indian Reservation and worked for
a tribal-owned construction company. The tribe owned 24,859 of the
49,294 acres of the Salt River Reservation,52 and 2470 Indians resided
on the reservation. 3 Under these facts, the Eighth Circuit held that
the forum tribe had criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.5 4
If the Supreme Court holds in Duro that tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the existing jurisdictional void
will be expanded. Except for Major Crimes Act crimes,55 the general
rule is that tribal courts have retained exclusive jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian Country. 6
Most state courts lack criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on
Indian reservations by Indians against Indians. 17 At least one state
court has specifically held that it lacked criminal jurisdiction over a
nonmember Indian. 8 If the federal prosecutors remain reluctant to
prosecute people for crimes committed on Indian reservations, a
Supreme Court ruling that the tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians would create a complete jurisdictional void. The
Indian tribes would lose important police powers that determine the
safety and order of life on their Indian reservations because nonmem-
ber Indian people who live and work on the forum reservation would
50. See Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 495 U.S. 676 (1990);
Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
51. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Duro on May 29, 1990. Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990). See the addendum to this comment.
52. 24,435 acres had been allotted. See Duro, 851 F.2d at 1136.
53. See DEPARxTENT oF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDL4N RESERVATIONS
AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS (1974).
54. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1146.
55. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382, 386-89 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 555 (1975);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973).
58. See State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 429 (Idaho 1980).
No. 1]
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be outside the reach of the community laws. 9 During Indian social
gatherings, like the Chief Seattle Days celebration in Oliphant, the
forum tribes would have no authority to enforce tribal laws against
visiting nonmember Indians.
b) Equal Protection
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court holds that the tribes
retain criminal jurisdiction over rionmember Indians, equal protection
questions will be raised. Why should the tribal courts have jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians when they lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians? Nonmember Indians often do not have any more of a
relationship with the forum tribe than do non-Indians. For example,
non..Indian residents have many more contacts with a forum reser-
vation than do nonmember Indian visitors. Thus nonmember Indians
could argue that criminal jurisdiction over them violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, because the only
reason the tribal court would have jurisdiction over them is their
status as Indians.
"]:ndian" has been held not to be a race-based classification. ° For
example, members of terminated tribes do not qualify as Indians,
regardless of their race, 6' while a person of mixed blood who is
enrolled in a recognized tribe or otherwise affiliated may be recognized
as an Indian. 62 Federally recognized tribes are political rather than
racial groups. 63 If "Indian" were considered a race-based classifica-
tion, most federal Indian law would be unconstitutional, because
59. There is often a significant number of "nonmember" Indians residing on
Indian reservations. The definition of "member" is not clear, ranging from "enrolled"
member to member of the community. If member means "enrolled" member, a large
percentage of Indians on many reservations would be considered "nonmembers."
"Member of the community" could mean any Indian with significant contacts. It
should be .noted that enrollment, or lack of enrollment, is not determinative of a
person's status as Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. See Ex parte
Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939). The determi-
nation of tribal membership is a power retained by the tribes. This is discussed infra
notes 138-40.
60. The Court has held that "Indian" is not a race based classification in cases
that uphold Indian preferences and cases in which federal statutes treat Indians dif-
ferently from non-Indians. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977);
Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974).
61. See United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; RONALD FLOvERs, CRIMINAL. JURISDICTION ALLOCATION
IN Ir.u COUNTRY 6 (1983).
63. Race is only one factor considered in determining whether an individual is an
Indian. Federal courts identify Indians by reference to an individual's degree of Indian
blood and his or her tribal or government recognition as an Indian. See United States
v. Broacheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
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federal Indian law is based upon treating Indian people and non-
Indian people differently.
The cases considering the constitutional status of "Indians" clas-
sification, however, do not solve all equal protection issues. The
question of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is a case in
which Indians from one tribal group are pitted against Indians from
other tribes. It is not a situation in which the use of a race-based
classification would restructure or constitutionally nullify the United
States-tribal relationship under federal Indian law. Thus it is possible
that alleged violations of equal protection could be reviewed with
strict scrutiny by the federal courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court
has held that strict scrutiny review should be applied for questions of
equal protection when a segment of the population with no represen-
tation in the government is singled out to bear an extra burden. 64
Since nonmember Indians have no say in the making of tribal laws,
cannot vote in tribal elections, and can do nothing to changes these
facts, the nonmember Indian could argue that jurisdiction over him
amounts to a race-based classification. If the forum tribe had criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, nonmember Indians could not make
this argument, because the nonmember Indian would no longer be
singled out from other nonmembers.
If the Court did not accept the race-based classification argument,
nonmember Indians could argue that because the distinction between
non-Indians and nonmember Indians is kin to ethnic distinctions,
middle-level equal protection scrutiny should be applied to determine
whether tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians violates
constitutional equal protection standards. 65 Assuming middle-level
scrutiny does not apply, nonmember Indians could argue that the
rational basis equal protection review should be applied. 66 The im-
portant point is that these equal protection arguments could be made.
If the Supreme Court holds that forum tribes have criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians, exercise of such criminal jurisdiction
might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.
III. Solutions
There are a number of solutions to these modern Indian Country
criminal jurisdiction problems. The rest of this discussion points out
some of these solutions and explains how they would work.
64. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
65. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-78 (1978)
66. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-93 (1979).
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A. Solutions by the United States Government
1. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over All Who
Commit Crimes on the Reservation
Congress could eliminate the jurisdictional void and the equal pro-
tection problems by recognizing the tribal right to criminal jurisdiction
over all, Indians and non-Indians, who commit crimes on Indian
reservations.
A decision to this effect would involve reconsidering the Supreme
Court's decision in Oliphant. In Oliphant, the Court held that the
Suquamish Indian Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over two non-
Indians accused of committing crimes on the Port Madison Indian
Reservation during the Suquamish Tribe's "Chief Seattle Days" cel-
ebration.67
Admittedly, it would have been politically difficult for the Supreme
Court to hold that the Suquamish Tribe had criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Of the Port Madison Reservation's 7276 acres, 6356 were
owned in fee simple by non-Indians. There were approximately 2928
non-Indians living on the reservation, but only fifty members of the
Suquamish Indian Tribe. The Court would have made an unpopular
decision if it held that a band of fifty Indians retained absolute
criminal jurisdiction over thousands of non-Indians who owned 63%
of the Indian Country forum. If the dispute had arisen on, for
example, the Navaho Indian Reservation, which is located on nearly
14,000,000 acres in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, with a popu-
lation of nearly 150,000 Indians, the Court might have ruled differ-
ently.
However, notwithstanding the unfavorable fact pattern, 61iphant
ignored the well-settled Indian law principle that an Indian tribe's
sovereign powers survive unless removed by federal statute or relin-
quished by treaty.6 Congress had not acted to remove criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians, nor had the tribes relinquished the power
by treaty. In spite of this, the Court held that because criminal
jurisdiction was not an "inherent" or historically held right of the
tribes, the Suquamish Tribe lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians. 69
Because the Court did not find evidence indicating that the Indian
tribes exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the past, the
67. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
611. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); Morton v. Mancari,
417 US. 535, 552 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U.S. 188, 196 (1876); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
69. The Court today will also invalidate sovereign powers that are "inconsistent"
with the Indian tribes' "dependent status." Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212; see United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
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Court held that the Indian tribes do not have this power today.70
Thus the Indian law rule of sovereignty, "what is not given away is
retained," was ignored.
Even if we accept the Oliphant Court's "inherent right" test, it is
not clear that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was not an
"inherent" or historically held right of the Indian tribes. The Court
cited case law, statutes, and treaties to support its position.7 ' However,
whether the tribes actually punished non-Indians committing offenses
in Indian Country is a significant historical question.
The Court's conclusions show a lack of understanding of Indian
history and culture. The Oliphant Court explained that the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by the Indian tribes was a
relatively new phenomenon. "Until the middle of this century, few
Indian tribes maintained any semblance of a formal court system.
Offenses by one Indian against another were usually handled by social
and religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes." 72 The
Court quoted an 1834 opinion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
describing the status of Indian criminal systems: "With the exception
of two or three tribes, who have within a few years past attempted
to establish some few laws and regulations among themselves, the
Indian tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much authority
to exercise any restraint.17 3
The traditional Indian "criminal justice" system was based upon
restitution rather than punishment. Indian offenses were handled by
social and religious pressure rather than formal adjudication. A glance
at United States history reveals that settlements in the early colonies
also handled offenses through social and religious pressure, and not
through formal courts. The Indian system did not empower Indian
"chiefs" with absolute authority to exercise restraint. Chiefs, as cho-
sen leaders, were not monarchs with ultimate authority to wield the
law. Because the tribal system of justice was so different from the
United States legal system and because the tribes were secretive in
important tribal decisions, the statements of the Court fall short of
the truth. Tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction is not a new phe-
nomenon.
Case law, statutes, and treaties were not the best historic record,
and these sources were valuable only for discerning which sovereign
powers had been recognized by the three branches of the United States
70. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. Even if the tribe never exercised its power of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court has held that the fact that a sovereign
power has never before been exercised does not mean that the power does not exist.
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
71. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206-08.
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id. (citing H.R. RP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1834)).
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government. While it is fair to say that traditional Anglo-American
courtroom style adjudications were not often used, it is reasonable to
believe that offenses committed against a tribe or tribal member by
a non-Indian were indeed punished in some manner. Serious historical
research would have been required to determine what actually hap-
pened to nonmember offenders.
a) Review of Treaties, Statutes and Case Law
Cited by the Oliphant Court
Assuming that treaties, statutes, and case law were an adequate
historical record for the purpose of determining whether the tribes
exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the materials cited
by the Court in Oliphant do not unequivocally show that the Suqua-
mish Tribe lacked such jurisdiction.
(1) Treaties
The Oliphant Court held that "from the earliest treaties with these
tribes, it was apparently assumed that the tribes did not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty
provision to that effect." 74 However, in Felix S. Cohen's original
Handbook of Federal Indian Law (published in 1942), the learned
trealise on Indian law, Cohen cited six treaties that acknowledge tribal
criminal jurisdiction "over white trespassers on tribal lands." '7" Even
without Cohen's opinion that the Indian tribes originally had criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the existence of the six treaties,
the ixeaty provisions cited by the Oliphant Court do not support the
Court's holding that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.
In the 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia,76 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that
the language used in treaties with the Indians shall never
be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of,
which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than
their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty,
they should be construed only in the latter sense . 7
74. Id. at 197.
75. CoaNr (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 146 n.212. The treaties cited are: Treaty
of Fort M'Intosh, Jan. 21, 1785, U.S.-Sachems et al., 7 Stat. 16; Treaty of Hopewell,
Jan. 10, 1786, U.S.-Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 24; Treaty of Peace and Friendship,
Aug. 7, 1790, U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 35; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, July 2,
1791, .S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 39; Treaty of Peace, Aug. 3, 1795, U.S.-Wyandots
et al., 7 Stat. 49.
76. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
77. rd. at 582.
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It is well settled that when reviewing treaties between an Indian tribe
and the United States, the treaties must be construed "in the sense
in which they would be naturally understood by the Indians." ' The
intent of the parties must be discerned, and the United States, "as
the party with the presumptively superior negotiating skills and su-
perior knowledge of the language in which the treaty is recorded, has
a responsibility to avoid taking advantage of the other side." 79
The first treaty ever signed by the United States with an Indian
tribe was the 1778 Treaty with the Delawares. It provided that neither
party would punish members of the other until a
fair and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of
both parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs, and
usages of the contracting parties and natural justice: The
mode of such trials to be hereafter fixed by the wise men
of the United States in Congress assembled, with the as-
sistance of ... deputies of the Delaware nation.80
The Court in Oliphant used this treaty to show that the United States
government intended for non-Indians to be tried only under the
auspices of the United States and in a manner fixed by the Continental
Congress. But the treaty specifically states that Congress and deputies
of the Delaware Nation will fix the mode of criminal trials .8 The
treaty did not say that non-Indians can only be tried under the auspices
of the United States and in a manner fixed by the Continental
Congress. Therefore these treaty provisions do not support the Court's
finding that Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.
In forming its view, the Court heavily relied upon an 1830 treaty
with the Choctaw Indian Tribe. That treaty provided that the Choctaw
tribe be guaranteed "the jurisdiction of all persons and property that
may be within their limits." 82 This provision is at best ambiguous.
"Within their limits" could mean only members of the tribe. At the
same time, however, "within their limits" could mean anyone, Indian
or non-Indian, residing within the Choctaw territory. Since ambiguous
provisions such as this should be construed in the favor of the Indian
tribes, the Court should not have cited this section of the treaty to
support the proposition that the Indian tribes lacked criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians. Had the Court construed the treaty in favor
78. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
79. Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979).
80. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, U.S.-Delaware Nation, art. 4, 7
Stat. 14.
81. Id.
82. Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession, and Limits, Sept. 27, 1830, U.S.-
Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 333.
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of the Choctaws, as mandated, a non-Indian living among the Choc-
taws would be subject to their criminal jurisdiction. This treaty section
did not support the Court's finding that Indians historically lacked
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
To support their reliance on the 1830 treaty with the Choctaws, the
Oliphant Court noted that the Choctaws had expressed a wish "that
Congress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by their
own laws any white man who shall come into their nation, and infringe
any of their national regulations." 3 The Court felt that this request
was inconsistent with the notion that the Choctaws originally had
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. However, this language could
be interpreted in more than one way. Many Indian tribes treating
with the United States were in an unequal bargaining position. While
this language could be interpreted to mean that the Choctaw Tribe
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians prior to the treaty and
were requesting such jurisdiction at the time of the treaty, the language
could also be interpreted as a request that the United States recognize
the Choctaw's continued criminal jurisdiction. Since treaty language
is to be interpreted in favor of the Indian tribes, the Court should
have seen this language as a request for recognition of continued
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes in Choctaw country,
instead of evidence that the tribe lacked such jurisdiction.
In fact, an earlier treaty with the Choctaws provided that "[if any
citizens of the United States ... shall attempt to settle on any of the
lands hereby allotted to the Indians to live on, such person shall
forfeit the protection of the United States of America, and the Indians
may punish him or not as they please." 84 Cohen specifically cites this
language to support the proposition that the Indians had criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians who settled in their territory. 5 The
Supreme Court in Oliphant said that this provision was put into the
83. Id. In the 1800s, when the Choctaws attempted to exercise their criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the United States Attorney General concluded that the
Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent congressional
authority. 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174 (1855); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693 (1834). However, the
refusal of the Attorney General to uphold the treaty provisions neither ratified lack
of jurisdiction over non-Indians nor nullified the treaty provisions.
84. Treaty of Hopewell, Jan. 3, 1786, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, art. 4, 7 Stat. 22.
The Oliphant Court noted that later treaties deleted this language and instead often
included the following clause: "any citizen of the United States, who shall do an injury
to any Indian of the [Tribal] nation, or to any other Indian or Indians residing in
their towns, and under their protection, shall be punished according to the laws of the
United States." Treaty of the Great Miami, Jan. 31, 1786, U.S.-Shawnee Nation, art.
3, 7 Stat. 26. However, this provision does not expressly remove criminal jurisdiction
from the tribes. It shows the Indians' agreement that the laws of the United States
would be used when determining punishment of non-Indian offenders.
85. Cottn (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 146 n.212.
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treaty merely to discourage people from settling on the Indian lands,
and was not meant to recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction.8 6 If this
were true, the provision could not possibly have any deterrent effect
upon prospective non-Indian settlers. A treaty provision of no con-
sequence would discourage no one. It is doubtful that the chiefs who
signed the treaty would have agreed with the Oliphant Court that
these important clauses had no effect.
Finally, the Court considered the Treaty of Point Elliot,87 which
included the United States' agreement with the Suquamish Indian
tribe. The Treaty of Point Elliot originally contained a provision that
"[ilnjuries committed by Whites towards [Indians are] not to be
revenged, but on complaint being made they shall be tried by the laws
of the United States and if convicted the offenders punished." 88
However, this provision was mysteriously dropped during the nego-
tiations with the Suquamish Tribe. The Court explained that there
was no evidence that the Indians objected to the provision; therefore
it must have been deleted because the Commission of Indian Affairs
must have preferred not to include it.89 But there is no evidence for
the Court's interpretation either. Because criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians was not removed by the Treaty of Point Elliot, and the
only provision that approached the matter was dropped during ne-
gotiations with the tribe, the Court should have construed the treaty
in favor of the Indians. For this reason the Treaty of Point Elliot at
the very least was not evidence that indicated an historical lack of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The Court concluded that merely by "recognizing their dependence"
upon the United States, the tribes probably recognized that the United
States would arrest and prosecute non-Indian criminals who came
onto the reservations. Because the Indians agreed not to harbor non-
Indian criminals, and because federal enclave law applied to the Indian
Country, the Court implied that the Indians were to deliver up any
non-Indian offender and not punish him themselves. 9° However, the
treaty sections cited to support the Court's position that the Indian
tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians fail to
do so. If the Court had construed these provisions in the favor of
the Indian tribes, it could not have come to this conclusion.
(2) Case Law
The Oliphant Court also cited Ex parte Kenyon9' and Ex parte
Mayfield 2 to support its position. Neither case affirmatively stated
86. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198 n.8.
87. Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, U.S.-Dwamish et al., 12 Stat. 927.
88. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207 n.16.
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id. at 208.
91. 14 F. Cas- 353 (W.fl. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720l.
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that the Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.
In Kenyon, the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
held in 1878 that in order for a tribal court to have criminal juris-
diction, the offender must be an Indian, and the offended must be
an Indian. 93 The Supreme Court in Oliphant noted that this conclusion
in Kenyon was reaffirmed in a 1970 opinion of the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior.Y However, in Kenyon, the district court
held that the Cherokee Nation lacked criminal jurisdiction over Ken-
yon because at the time the alleged crime was committed, Kenyon
was no longer a resident of the Cherokee district.95 The Oliphant
Court relied heavily on the fact that the judge who heard the case
handled many cases involving Indian law, and that the Indians of the
district deeply respected him. It may have been the opinion of this
one judge that the Indians in his district lacked criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians at the time he was deciding the Kenyon case, but
the opinion does not say that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
was never a power of the tribes. This was the Supreme Court's
rationale in Oliphant, but Kenyon does not support it.
The Court also looked to the 1891 decision of the Supreme Court
in Mayfield to demonstrate Congress' intent to reserve to the federal
courts jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian Country involv-
ing non-Indians. However, Mayfield held only that the Cherokee
Nation had exclusive criminal jurisdiction over member Indians.9 6 The
issue in Mayfield was whether the treaty with the Cherokee Nation
reserved exclusive criminal jurisdiction over offenses by one Indian
against another. In support of Mayfield's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, the Court said in dictum that "the general object of [Con-
gress'] statutes is to vest in the courts of the [Indian] nation[s]
jurisdiction of all controversies between Indians ... and to reserve
to the courts of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to which
its citizens are parties on either side." ' 97 However, the statutes discussed
in Mayfield provided only that the Indians retain exclusive jurisdiction
over all controversies between Indians. 9 They did not remove Indian
jurisdiction over offenses involving non-Indians. Therefore the dictum
in Mayfield does not support the Court's conclusion that the Indian
93. Id. at 116.
94. That opinion was subsequently withdrawn in 1974. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at
201 n.1 i.
95. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200.
96. Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 116.




tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
(3) Statutes
The Supreme Court has held, and it is well settled, that "statutes
passed for the benefit of the dependent Indian tribes or communities
are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians." 99 This is the same principle applied in constru-
ing treaties. The Oliphant Court relied on a number of statutes, but
failed in each instance to construe the acts in favor of the Indian
tribes.' °° When the statutes are read in a way favorable towards the
Indians, the statutes do not support the Court's proposition that the
Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In 1790, through the Federal Trade and Intercourse Act,'0' Congress
extended its jurisdiction to Indian Country to provide protection to
the Indians "from the violence of the lawless part of our frontier
inhabitants.' ' 0 2 The government feared that if they did not protect
the Indians on the frontier, the Indians would become violent and
retaliate. Congress then extended federal enclave law to Indian Coun-
try, assuming jurisdiction for all criminal offenses except for offenses
"committed by one Indian against another."10 3
Congress did not say that this jurisdiction was exclusive - that it
removed criminal jurisdiction from the tribes - but, the Oliphant
Court held that this was the "unspoken assumption." This "unspoken
assumption," the Court said, "was also evident in other Congressional
actions during the 19th century."'14 For example, the Trade and
Intercourse Act was amended in 1854 to protect Indians from double
jeopardy in federal court after facing trial in the tribal court.105
Because Congress did not provide similar protection for non-Indians,
the Supreme Court saw this as an indication of the Indian tribes'
lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.'01
Given the Court's duty to construe ambiguous statutes in favor of
the Indian tribes, this amendment of the Trade and Intercourse Act
should not have been used to support the Oliphant Court's argument
that the Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. At the time the Trade and Intercourse Act was amended
99. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
100. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
101. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
102. Seventh Annual Address of President George Washington (Dec. 8, 1795), in 1
MEssAGFS ARD PAPERS OF Tm PREsIDENTs 1789-1897, at 182, 185 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896).
103. 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
104. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
105. 10 Stat. 270, § 3 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
106. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
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tribal courts rarely prosecuted non-Indians. As in Kenyon,10' the
federal courts reserved the habeas corpus power to review decisions
of the Indian courts against non-Indian citizens whose constitutional
rights had supposedly been violated. Non-Indians were entitled to a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, and these writs were often granted. 10 8
Therefore it is likely that Congress did not have non-Indians in mind
when it amended the Trade and Intercourse Act to protect Indians
from double jeopardy. Congress' failure to mention non-Indians in
its amendment of the Trade and Intercourse Act had nothing to do
with the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Favorably construed, the amendment is irrelevant.
The Court was similarly misguided in its analysis of Congress'
interesting but unpassed Western Territory Bill.'09 The Court extracted
from Congress' language the notion that the Indian tribes would not
have had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in that territory. The
Western Territory Bill was a proposal to give the Indian tribes their
own state in the West. The bill places "officers, and persons in the
service of the United States, and persons required to reside in the
Indian Country by treaty stipulations" under the protection of the
laws of the United States. This stipulation did not purport to take
away Indian criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but the Court
called that an "unspoken assumption" of the bill." 0 Travellers were
also to be protected under the bill, but non-Indians settling in the
territory without government business were not to be protected. The
Court assumed that the reason was to discourage non-Indians from
settling on the Indian land. The words, however, are inescapable:
protection is not extended to non-Indians settling without government
business in Indian territory."'
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on
the Western Territory Bill, noting that
Congress' great concern over criminal jurisdiction in this
proposed Indian territory contrasts markedly with its total
failure to address criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on
other reservations, which frequently bordered non-Indian
settlements. The contrast suggests that Congress shared the
view... that Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction
to try non-Indians." 2
107. 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720).
108. CoHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 336.
109. H.R. REP. No. 474, § 6.
110. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 205.
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But how does the contrast show this? Perhaps Congress knew that
the Indian tribes retained jurisdiction and thus it did not need to
discuss the issue. Probably the issue was not urgent enough for
Congress to pay it any heed. After all, the bill was not passed. Even
today, when the question of Indian criminal jurisdiction over the
reservations clearly calls for action, Congress has not spoken. If
doubtful expressions are to be construed in favor of the Indian tribes,
the only way to interpret the Western Territory Bill is to conclude
that the Indian tribes would have had criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians who settled without government business on the Indian lands.
The Oliphant Court used the same misguided logic in considering
the Major Crimes Act of 1885.113 That Act granted the federal courts
concurrent jurisdiction over fourteen enumerated crimes committed
by Indians in Indian Country. Because the Act does not explicitly
extend itself to non-Indians, the Court reasoned, a tribal court must
not have jurisdiction over such people. 1 4 The Act itself says that
"[any Indian ... shall be subject to the same law and penalties as
any other persons committing any of the above offenses."'1 5 On its
face, the Act gives the impression that such jurisdiction already exists
for non-Indians. As mentioned above, the federal courts additionally
have jurisdiction to grant the writ of habeas corpus to such non-
Indians. When considering the history and reasoning behind the Major
Crimes Act, it is unsurprising that non-Indian offenders were not
mentioned. ' 6 When construing the presumptions in favor of the Indian
tribes, one can see that this legislation did not provide unequivocal
evidence that the Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
(4) Conclusion about Oliphant's "Inherent Right"
Test and the Combined Presumptions of Congress,
the Courts and the Executive
While the Court in Oliphant admitted that the "presumptions of
Congress" were not conclusive, it held that the combined "presump-
113. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1988)).
114. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
115. Id.
116. It is also possible that non-Indians were not mentioned in the Major Crimes
Act because crimes committed by non-Indians were not at issue in Exparte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883), discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text. Congress had
no reason to mention non-Indians in the Major Crimes Act because the district courts
already had jurisdiction over them. This also tends to show that the fact that non-
Indians were not provided for in the Major Crimes Act does not support the Court's
argument that the Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.
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tions" of Congress, the Executive, and the lower federal courts carried
considerable weight. 17 However, as seen above, there is substantial
doubt that these bodies individually or collectively held the presump-
tion that Indian tribes historically lacked criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.
After an examination of the case law, statutes, and treaties cited
by the Supreme Court, it is hardly clear that criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians was not an "inherent" or historically held right of
the Indian tribes. On the contrary, it appears that the Indian tribes
did indeed exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians at one
time." 8 The old Indian law rule that a tribe's sovereign powers remain
unless relinquished by treaty or removed by statute should have been
followed by the Court. Since there is no evidence that criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians was relinquished or removed in Oliphant,
that tribal power should have remained. Congress should consider this
when, reviewing the history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
b) Reaffirmance of the Old Indian Law Rule
In 1982 the Supreme Court decided Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe,"9 which held that the fact that a sovereign power has not been
exercised before does not mean that the power does not exist today.120
This decision is counter to the Court's reasoning in Oliphant.'2 1
Merrion upheld a severance tax imposed by the Jicarilla Apache
tribe on non-Indian mining activities on its reservation. The Court
noted that "[a] nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe
remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign
power."'' In support of its decision, the Court noted that non-Indian
miners on the reservation "benefit from the provision of police pro-
tection and other governmental services ... assured by the existence
of tribal government."'' l Because the tribe's taxing power was a
necessary tool of self-government and territorial control, and because
the power was not preempted by federal statutes, the Court upheld
the power. 12 4
117. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
118. CoHEN (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 364.
119. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
120. Id. at 145.
121. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Ironically, in Jicarilla Justice Stevens stated in dissent
that Oliphant held that the Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by nonmembers on the Indian reservation. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 171 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145.
123. Id. at 137-38.
124. Id. at 141.
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Similarly, non-Indians and nonmember Indians living on a reser-
vation benefit from the protections of tribal criminal codes. Like the
taxing power, criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is a
necessary tool of self-government. Without criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians and nonmember Indians, there is often no law enforce-
ment over such offenders. Congress should consider this Merrion
opinion in conjunction with a review of Oliphant when considering
the modern problems of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
2. Arguments Against Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
over Non-Indians and Nonmember Indians
Although Oliphant appears to depend on faulty historical analysis,
to some the result in the case has some inherent appeal. The Supreme
Court believed that subjecting non-Indians to tribal laws would be
unfair.12 The Court said that since tribal laws are so different from
state laws, federal laws, and the laws of other tribes, they create
cultural standards non-Indians and nonmember Indians are not ac-
customed to. i26 Others have argued that because non-Indians and
nonmember Indians do not participate in the tribal government and
have no say in the creation of the tribal laws, they should not be
subject to those laws. 12" Finally, because Indian tribal courts are not
bound by the United States Constitution, it is feared that people
charged with offenses in the tribal courts may be denied their consti-
tutional rights to equal protection and due process. 12
8
While there is merit to these arguments, a closer look shows that
they are not as powerful as they sound. The arguments are not strong
enough to overcome the old Indian Law rule that the tribes retain
what has not been taken away.129 Congress should consider each of
these arguments against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
and nonmember Indians, and the counter arguments presented below.
125. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
126. Id. at 211; see Wounded Head v. Tribal Council, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th
Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973).
127. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980); cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975).
128. The Supreme Court has held that the Indian tribes are not bound by the
limitations of the United States Constitution, except to the extent that Congress imposes
those standards on the tribes. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
(1978) ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically
as limitations on federal or state authority."); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)
(Fifth Amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment did not limit the authority
of the Cherokee Nation to prosecute a person under its jurisdiction).
129. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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a) Modern Indian Tribal Codes Are Not So
Different from State and Federal Laws
In Ex parte Crow Dog,30 the Supreme Court held that because
United States law was foreign to the Indians, Indians would be judged
by an unfamiliar standard not created for them. Thus the Court ruled
that it would be unfair to subject the Indians to United States law.' 3'
Using the reverse rationale, the Court in Oliphant said that the same
is true today when non-Indians are tried in the Indian courts. 32
The laws used in the tribal courts do not significantly differ from
state laws, federal laws, and the laws of other tribes; non-Indians and
nonmaember Indians would recognize most of the criminal prohibitions
and would not be subjected to unusual cultural standards if tried in
these courts. In fact, most tribal codes are patterned after state and
federal codes. 33 Tribal codes prohibit common criminal offenses, such
as assault and battery, disorderly conduct, resisting lawful arrest,
trespass, theft, breaking and entering, and illegal possession and
purchase of alcohol. 134 Tribal codes are written in the same familiar,
often identical, language as state and federal codes. The codes include
sections outlining and defining civil procedure, criminal procedure,
probate law, traffic law, employment rights, land and natural re-
sources regulations, and housing and building ordinances.' 3"
These prohibitions are obviously not derived from ancient tribal
laws. While some Indian tribes have continued to practice their ancient
tribal laws in addition to formal tribal courts, non-Indians are often
not even aware that these ancient practices exist. Some Indian tribes
maintain a traditional system of government in which members of the
tribe are subject to ancient tribal laws. "Hearings" are conducted by
tribal elders and "sentences" are imposed on tribal members who
breach the tribal laws. These "hearings" are often secret and never
open to non-Indians.'3 6 There is no chance that non-Indians and
130. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
131. Id. at 571.
132. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
133. Interview with John St. Clair, Chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapaho
Tribal Court, Fort Washakie, Wyoming and drafter of the Law and Order Code of
the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation (June, 1989);
Interview with Andrew Baldwin, In-House Counsel for the Northern Arapaho Indian
Tribe, lEtbete, Wyoming (June, 1989).
134. E.g., The Law and Order Code of the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes of the
Wind River Indian Reservation, tit. VII (1988). Other criminal offenses prohibited are
carrying a concealed weapon, extortion, receiving stolen property, fraud, forgery, and
embezzlement.
135. Id.
136. Interview with a Seminole Indian at the Hollywood Indian Reservation in
Broward County, Florida (Mar., 1989). For example, the Seminole Indians of Florida
have such a system.
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nonmember Indians will be subject to these ancient cultural standards.
Because the tribal codes used in tribal courts closely parallel state
and federal codes, and because the ancient tribal laws are closely
guarded and not imposed on non-Indians and nonmember Indians,
there is little chance today that non-Indians and nonmember Indians
will be subject to a cultural standard they are not accustomed to in
tribal court.
b) Nonparticipation in Tribal Government
Should Not Affect Criminal Jurisdiction
The fact that non-Indians and nonmember Indians do not partici-
pate in tribal government and do not participate in the creation of
tribal laws should not affect tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians and nonmember Indians.
In United States v. Mazurie,137 the Supreme Court said that "the
fact that the Mazuries could not become members of the tribe, and
therefore could not participate in the tribal government, does not
alter our conclusion" that the tribe has the power to regulate non-
members on its reservation.' Similarly, lack of constituency does not
limit criminal jurisdiction in the state and the federal courts. A person
from New York who commits a crime in Florida cannot argue that
Florida has no criminal jurisdiction over her because she can not vote
in Florida's elections, hold office in Florida, or sit on a Florida jury.
The simple fact that a person is not a member of the forum tribe is
not a persuasive argument against holding that the tribes retain crim-
inal jurisdiction over those who enter their reservations.
c) Indian Civil Rights Act Protection
The Supreme Court has held that the Indian tribes are not bound
by the limitations of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights,
except to the extent that Congress imposes those standards on the
tribes.3 9 As a result of this ruling, some fear that cherished Bill of
Rights' protections will not be extended to people tried in tribal courts.
The Court in Oliphant saw this possibility, holding that since United
States citizens are protected from unwarranted intrusions on personal
liberty, the Indian tribes have given up their criminal jurisdiction over
137. 419 U.S. 544 (1974).
138. Id. at 557-58.
139. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("As separate
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as un-
constrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on
federal or state authority."); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Fifth Amendment's
requirement of grand jury indictment did not limit the authority of the Cherokee
Nation to prosecute a person under its jurisdiction).
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non-Indians by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States.',4
Congress responded to this fear by passing the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 (ICRA). 141 The ICRA guarantees many constitutional
rights, including the right to due process and equal protection, to all
people charged in the tribal courts.142
Since the ICRA is "a limited intrusion on tribal sovereignty" and
"interpretation and application of the ICRA are largely matters for
tribal institutions alone,' 1 43 some argue that the act has no teeth and
the tribal courts can proceed as they wish without considering it.
However, the federal courts have held that if a tribe has adopted
Anglo-American procedures, and most, if not all of them have, the
federal courts may apply a pure constitutional analysis when consid-
ering alleged violations of the ICRA. 144
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court noted that while the ICRA provided
for "a trial by jury of not less than six persons,' 14 "the tribal court
is not explicitly prohibited from excluding non-Indians from the jury
even when a non-Indian is being tried.' 46 However, since the Suqua-
mish Tribe had adopted Anglo-American procedures in their tribal
court,147 a pure constitutional analysis could have been applied, instead
of removing criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians outright. An ex-
ample of how this analysis would work is presented in Strauder v.
West Virginia.14 In Strauder, a black criminal defendant was found
guilty of murder by an all-white jury. The defendant complained that
he had been denied his constitutional right to be tried by a jury of
his peers, as blacks had been excluded from the jury. The Supreme
Court held that the West Virginia court had violated the defendant's
140. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
141. COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 666.
142. Gregory Schultz, The Federal Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of
Non-Indians Civil Litigants in Tribal Courts After Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
62 DENv. U. L. REv. 761, 773-75 (1985); see also COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17,
at 336.
143. COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 669.
144. Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1988);
White B-agle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973). When it appears
that constitutional standards will force an alien culture on the tribes, however, the
federal courts have held that they will not apply constitutional standards as long as
tribal laws are being applied uniformly by the tribal courts. See Wounded Head v.
Tribal Council, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483
F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973). In the case of a non-Indian tried in tribal court, this
consideration would not apply because constitutional standards do not force an alien
culture on non-Indians.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1988).
146. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 n.4.
147. Id. at 193-94.
148. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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constitutional due process rights, and remanded the case to the state
court for a new trial, with instructions that the defendant was to be
tried by a jury of his peers. The Court did not remove the state's
criminal jurisdiction over blacks.' 49
If the tribal court in Oliphant had violated Oliphant's or Belgarde's
constitutional rights by denying him trial by a jury of his peers, the
tribal court should have been treated similarly to the state court in
Strauder. The Supreme Court could have remanded the case to the
tribal court with instructions to provide for non-Indians on the jury.
While it is true that such a holding would infringe on tribal sover-
eignty, it would be less of an infringement than removing criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians completely.
Because the ICRA guarantees "certain procedural rights to anyone
tried in Indian tribal court, many of the dangers that might have
accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians a few decades ago have disappeared.""110 Thus, removal
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember Indians in
the tribal courts for fear of civil rights deprivations was an unnecessary
response.
d) Avoiding Tribal Jurisdiction
The court in Merrion v. Jacarilla Apache Tribe noted that "a tribe
has no authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal
lands or conducts business with the tribe." '' 5' Thus the tribe has no
jurisdiction over non-Indians or nonmember Indians until they enter
the reservation. Non-Indians and nonmember Indians who choose to
enter the reservation willingly submit to the jurisdiction of the home
tribe. The Merrion Court held that "the nonmember's presence and
conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe
may choose to impose."' 5 2
If non-Indians and nonmember Indians want to avoid some of the
risks of tribal jurisdiction, they can stay off the Indian reservations.
The reservations were created for the benefit and protection of the
Indian tribes, as homes where they could reside in a traditional
manner, unmolested by non-Indian society. This fact is forgotten by
many non-Indians who have settled on Indian lands and by most non-
Indians in general. While it is true that the United States government
allowed non-Indians to settle in Indian Country and actually encour-
149. Id. at 312. This argument was originally introduced to the author by Lawrence
R. Baca, an American Indian graduate of Harvard Law School and an expert in Indian
law.
150. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
151. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142 (1982).
152. Id. at 147.
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aged such settlement with legislation such as the Dawes Acty53 this is
no reason to reduce the tribal right to protect themselves against
lawless non-Indian residents of Indian reservations.'54
3. Criminal Jurisdiction over People with Significant Contacts
If Congress does not wish to affirm the Indian tribes' criminal
jurisdiction over all non-Indians and nonmember Indians who commit
crimes in Indian Country, it could reduce the jurisdictional void and
equad protection problems by recognizing the Indian tribes' criminal
jurisdiction over those non-Indians and nonmember Indians who
maintain significant contacts with the forum Indian reservation.
The definition of significant contacts would be an important ques-
tion. Supporters of Indian sovereignty would argue that the definition
should be left to the tribes. Others would argue that this gives the
tribes too much discretion: if the tribes define significant contacts,
the Court may as well recognize complete criminal jurisdiction over
all who enter the reservation. A reasonable definition could be created
by Congress. For example, significant contacts could be defined as
purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum
tribe's law. 55 Residents and frequent visitors would easily fall into
this category, while people who merely traverse the reservation would
fall outside of the category. 56
With respect to equal protection, assuming the tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the significant contacts standard would
eliminate the chance that a nonmember Indian who has no contacts
with the Indian reservation will be subject to the laws of the tribe
solely because he or she is an Indian. People who live or work in the
community and continuously benefit from the protections of the tribal
laws could expect to be subject to the tribal laws. Indian people who
have few or no contacts with the forum reservation could expect that
153. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-354 (1988)).
154. Allotted lands keep their Indian Country status. See COHEN (1942 ED.), supra
note 1, at 8.
155. In Merrion the Court, in upholding a severance tax imposed by the tribe on
non-Indian mining activities on the reservation, noted that non-Indian miners on the
reservation "benefit from the provision of police protection and other governmental
service;." Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142.
156. To ensure that traffic laws are obeyed, some tribes have entered into agree-
ments with the state highway patrol for concurrent arrest jurisdiction. People who
violate the traffic laws on or off the reservation may be cited by either the state
highway patrol or the Indian police. Non-Indians are heard in state court. Indians are
heard in tribal court. The fines are paid to the Indian tribe if the violation occurred
on the reservation and to the state if the violatiQn occurred off the reservation. The
Shoshone and Arapaho tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation and the state of
Wyoming have a concurrent arrest jurisdiction agreement for traffic violations.
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they will be treated the same as non-Indians under Oliphant, as was
decided in Greywater v. Joshua.17
The jurisdictional void would similarly be reduced. Non-Indians
and nonmember Indians who have significant contacts with the Indian
reservation would know that because they have chosen to live or
conduct business on the reservation they must follow the tribal laws.
It is important to remember that the people who argued that the
tribes lacked jurisdiction over them were all charged with breaking
tribal laws. In no case was it alleged that the tribes were committing
crimes against the criminal defendants in Oliphant, Duro, and Grey-
water. A request by the tribes that visitors obey their criminal codes
while on the reservation is not a very tall order.
B. Solutions by the Indian Tribes
No matter what Congress and the federal courts do, the Indian
tribes have several options available to them to protect their reser-
vations from individuals, Indian and non-Indian alike, who choose
to disobey tribal laws. There are at least three ways the tribes can
protect themselves against the jurisdictional void. First, the tribes can
expand their definition of "tribal member." Second, the tribes can
decriminalize their tribal codes. Third, the tribes can exclude all
nonmembers from their territory.
1. Tribal Expansion of the Definition of "Tribal Member" for
Purposes of Criminal Jurisdiction
A decision that the tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians will be difficult to enforce, because there are many standards
used to determine who is and who is not a member of an Indian
tribe. For enrollment purposes, an Indian can be racially a member
of the tribe but not officially enrolled as a member. However, en-
rollment, or lack of enrollment, is not determinative of a person's
status as Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction." 8 The
modem test of Indian status for federal jurisdiction considers the
degree of Indian blood and tribal or governmental recognition as an
Indian.15 9
Indian tribes have the power to determine their own tribal mem-
bership. 60 This is done by written law, custom, intertribal agreement,
157. 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
158. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643
(1939).
159. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
160. CorNa (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 248; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Daniel Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906)
(Cherokee Intermarriage Cases); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
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or treaty with the United States.16' Non-Indians have been adopted
into tribes and have been considered Indians for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country. 62 The Indian tribes could expand their
trib l rolls to include Indians and non-Indians who live in the com-
munity and participate in activities on the Indian reservation.
However, membership in an Indian tribe is a bilateral relationship.
A member can terminate his or her membership at any time. 6 3 If the
tribes did choose to expand their tribal rolls to include nonmembers
who live in the community, the people affected would probably have
to receive notice and have the opportunity to deny tribal membership.
It is doubtful that a member who has accepted membership in the
past could terminate his or her membership in response to being
charged with a crime, however. It is within the power of the Indian
tribes to treat members of the community as members of the tribe
for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.'6
2. Decriminalization of Tribal Codes
The Indian tribes' civil jurisdiction is much broader and less re-
stricted than tribal criminal jurisdiction. 65 It is settled law that Indian
tribes have the authority to pass civil laws regulating non-Indians on
the Indian reservation.'" If the Court holds that the tribes lack
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the tribes can respond
by decriminalizing their tribal codes and passing new laws defining
numerous civil offenses. The tribes are not limited in civil remedies
as they are in criminal remedies. 67 Thus civil laws imposing large
fines on offenders could be implemented. The tribe has civil jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians and non-Indians alike, so no one would
161. COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 248; see Delaware Indians v. Cherokee
Nation, 193 U.S. 127 (1904).
162. Daniel Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
163. COHEN (1982 ED.), supra note 17, at 22; see Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F.
Cas. 695 (D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891).
164. For some tribes, expanding the tribal roll would be quite unpopular. For tribes
owning mineral and gas leases, for example, each member of the tribe is entitled to a
per capita payment each month, representing his or her interest in the lease. The
Shoshone and Arapaho tribes at Wind River have such an agreement. Adding tribal
members means spreading the money from these oil and gas leases over a larger
population. On Wind River this would be an unpopular decision. On the other hand,
many tribal services, such as medical car, are distributed not by membership but by
Indian status. Thus anyone who is Indian can go to the Indian Health Center and
receive free treatment and care. These facts were observed by the author when he
worked for Wind River Legal Services, Fort Washakie, Wyoming, during the summer
of 1989.
165. COHEN (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 382.
166. Id. at 253; see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
167. COHEN (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 341-42.
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escape these civil regulations. This would be a powerful and effective
response to Oliphant.
3. Exclusion of Nonmembers from Tribal Territory
If all else fails, the tribes have the power and right to exclude all
nonmembers from their territory.' 68 This would be an extreme move,
but if necessary the tribes could do it. Cohen, in his 1942 handbook,
stated that "because the exclusionary power is a fundamental sover-
eign attribute intimately tied to a tribe's ability to protect its integrity
and order of its territory and the welfare of its members, it is an
internal matter over which sovereignty is retained."' 169
IV. Conclusion
Both Congress and the Indian tribes have remedies available to
them that could be used to resolve the modern problems of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country. The Court's ruling in Duro will clarify
which path the Indian tribes or Congress should take in response to
this difficult problem.
In taking remedial action, Congress should remember the following
points: because tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has not
been relinquished by treaty or removed by statute, that power remains
with the tribes. The prevalence of non-Indian crime on the Indian
reservations and the lack of prosecution on the part of the federal
and state courts should be considered. Additionally, Congress should
take into account the increasing availability of sophisticated tribal
criminal justice systems now functioning on many reservations to deal
with non-Indian criminal offenders. The ICRA provides many con-
stitutional protections to non-Indians who would be tried in the tribal
courts.
Finally, Congress should remember that the Indian reservations were
originally set aside for use by the Indians. It is largely the United
States government's fault that non-Indians have settled in Indian
Country, and that Indian lands have been allotted and sold to non-
Indians. Congress should remember that the non-Indians in Oliphant
were people who had been charged with violations of the Indian tribal
168. Id. at 252. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Powers of
Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 48-50 (1934); Quecharn Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1976); Otiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975);
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906);
1 Op. Atty Gen. 465 (1821). There are two exceptions to this rule. The tribes cannot
exclude nonmembers who hold federal patents in fee lands in the Indian Country. See
also United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
450 U.S. 544 (1981). And the tribes must keep reservation roads constructed with
federal funds open to the public. 25 C.F.R. § 162.8 (1980).
169. COHEN (1942 ED.), supra note 1, at 341-42.
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codes. The tribes were not charged with any wrongdoing. The non-
Indians in these cases were not strangers to the Indian reservation or
its system of law enforcement; in fact, they lived there. However,
these non-Indians knew that the Suquamish Tribe's jurisdiction over
thera was questionable, and took full advantage of this fact. Today,
thanks to Oliphant, non-Indians know that practically no one has
criminal jurisdiction over them on the Indian reservations. Therefore,
Congress should take a close look at what the Supreme Court did in
Oliphant, and take action on the Court's suggestions.
Addendum
Since the writing of this comment, the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled in Duro v. Reina.1 70 Justice Brennan was joined by Justice
Marshall in a respectable dissent which includes many of the argu-
ments made in this comment. In this addendum, the practical results
of Reina are discussed with some thoughts concerning possible solu-
tions to the problems created by Reina and Oliphant.
The Supreme Court's decision in Reina is a further infringement
upon Indian sovereignty. The decision in Reina is based upon Oli-
phant, which is heavily criticized above. This decision further extends
the misguided logic found in Oliphant. The practical result of the
Reina decision, as Justice Brennan explains in his dissent, is a legal
jurisdictional void, in which Indian tribes, the federal government,
and the states lack jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who commit
criminal misdemeanors on Indian reservations.
The Indian tribes have several options with which to respond to
Reina. One option is to request congressional acknowledgment, not
delegation, of a tribes right to enforce criminal codes against non-
members who enter Indian reservations. The legal jurisdictional void
created by Reina adds to the already powerful argument for such
congressional acknowledgment.
Another option is the decriminalization of the tribal codes. While
decriminalization seems like a good option, such a move could open
the door to a future Supreme Court decision, reminiscent of Oliphant,
that such civil jurisdiction is inconsistent with the tribes' dependent
status. Thus any move to decriminalize the tribal codes should be
made with caution.
A third option available to the tribes is the option of exercising
their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they
deem to be undesirable from tribal lands. While this could be some-
what complicated on reservations on which fee lands are held by
nonmembers, exclusion of undesirable nonmembers could be very
170. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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effective. Nonmembers of the tribe, upon action of the appropriate
tribal authorities, could be banned from tribal lands forever. Such
action would keep nonmember criminals off tribal lands, and would
be an effective deterrent to crimes committed by nonmembers who
wished to retain the privilege of visiting or residing upon tribal lands.
A universal policy of excluding undesirable persons from tribal lands
could be a powerful answer to the problems created by the Reina and
Oliphant decisions.
Finally, in order to punish nonmember offenders, Indian tribes
could enter into reciprocal agreements with the states and other tribal
governments for prosecution of nonmembers who commit crimes on
their reservations. Thus a non-Indian could be prosecuted for a crime
committed on the forum reservation in state courts, and a nonmember
Indian could be prosecuted for a crime by his or her own tribe, Each
of these options is available to the Indian tribes as possible solutions
to the jurisdictional void problems created Oliphant and Reina.
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